What do Israel’s critics really want?

Israel’s operation Protective Edge is on its eighteenth day, and Israel’s critic are intensifying their demand that Israel stop its operation.  It is clear to any reasonable observer, as Canadian columnist Michael Den Tandt wrote recently (The simple question detractors can’t answer) that “Hamas has put Israel in a position where it has no choice but to defend its citizens”.  So what do Israel’s critics really want?

When pressed to give a reason, Israel’s critics say that the humanitarian situation in Gaza is not acceptable and Israeli civilians have suffered very few casualties.  The implication is clearly that Israel should simply grin and bear it.  Israel should accept daily missile attacks on its civilians with the high likelihood that a large number of victims will ensue, possibly in a missile strike on Tel Aviv or other large urban area.  Israel should accept that its main airport be threatened and that airlines suspend flights to it.  Israel should accept the impact of such a situation on the morale of its citizens and on its economy.  This is what they are really saying.  And this would not resolve the humanitarian crisis for Palestinians because sooner or later fighting would have to resume anyway.

But it doesn’t stop there.  Hamas has an extensive set of tunnels to allow it to smuggle weapons in and to allow it to infiltrate Israel’s civilian population and commit extensive acts of terror.  If Israel does not destroy the tunnels, then it should expect more than a daily shower of missiles on its cities.  It should also expect that heavily armed terrorists could attack its schools, malls, and parks at any time of the day or night.

If presented with these facts, Israel’s critics will admit that Hamas’ ethics aren’t spotless but then they retreat to the claim that, as the cowardly Palestinian Authority likes to say, the real root of the problem is Israel’s occupation.  Which occupation?  Israel left Gaza years ago and it even dismantled its settlements there, causing great pain to many of its people.

Israel’s critics will then say that even though Gaza isn’t technically occupied, it is not free to trade with the outside due to Israel’s and Egypt’s blockades, and that this is causing great hardship for the Palestinians in Gaza.  Yet, when Israel loosened its blockade of Gaza and allowed more construction materials in, Hamas did not build school and hospitals; it built tunnels for its terrorist activity.  It is blindingly obvious that Hamas uses any loosening of the blockade to arm itself better for the next confrontation with Israel.

Israel’s critics will also mention Israel’s occupation in the West Bank.  Does anyone really think that Hamas is building terror tunnels in Gaza and launching missiles against Israel in order to free the West Bank?  If that were true, Hamas would demand a two-state solution as its condition for ending the war in Gaza.  Instead its conditions are the release of convicted criminals and the lifting of the blockade so that it can build more tunnels and bring in more missiles and other long-range weapons.  In addition, after leaving Gaza, statements by various leading Israeli politicians indicate that Israel intended to follow that up with an evacuation of the West Bank, and the only reason this did not happen is because missile attacks from Gaza convinced Israelis that unilateral withdrawal was not a palatable option.

It is extremely clear that Israel cannot choose to stop the operation until Hamas is disabled at least temporarily, and yet Israel’s critic are demanding Israel’s unconditional surrender.  As demonstrated here, we know that those critics are not asking Israel’s surrender for the sake of Palestinians or for the sake of peace, so the only alternative left is that they agree with Hamas’ objective of destroying Israel.  They agree with Hamas’ objective of killing all the Jews in Israel and establishing an Islamist dictatorship in its place.  Israel’s critics are in fact in a way worse than Hamas; Hamas at least has the courage to state what it really wants.

Note:  This blog won first place in the category "Non-Council" at the site http://www.watcherofweasels.org/ on the week of August 1, 2014.

"Proportionality" in the Israel/Gaza War

One question that often comes up in the ongoing (and third) war between Israel and Hamas is the issue of proportionality.  As of this writing, 318 Palestinians and one Israeli have been reported killed.  So why the discrepancy?

I will answer this question in two ways: first to simply explain why the discrepancy, and second to explain why the question is misleading and largely irrelevant.

The discrepancy in counts is due to a number of factors:

• Israel has built an anti-rocket system called Iron Dome that is very effective at intercepting rockets and destroying them before they can reach populated areas.
• Israel has built shelters for its civilian population and has trained its citizens on using them when they hear sirens announcing the arrival of rockets.
• Hamas did not build any way to protect its civilians; they have instead used their resources to build shelters for Hamas terrorists and for rockets and to build tunnels to smuggle weapons.
• Hamas knows that it cannot win militarily.  Its strategy is to ensure that as many civilians die as possible to increase external pressures on Israel to accept Hamas terms, i.e., the release of criminals and the end of Israel’s blockade on weapons to Gaza.  Therefore, Hamas uses civilians as human shields and coaxes them into going near likely targets.
• Despite the high number of Palestinian casualties and Hamas’ best efforts at increasing civilian casualties, a large number, if not most Palestinians dead are Hamas terrorists (accurate estimates are not available at this time).
• The number of reported casualties on the Israeli side does not account for Israelis who have died or have had serious medical problems as a result of panic during rocket attacks.

Despite all of the above, I question the validity of the question in the first place.  Israel is attacking Hamas in order to stop rocket attacks into Israel, and Israel has the right and even the duty to defend its citizens.  Despite the use of Iron Dome, the rockets still terrorize Israeli citizens and cause damage to the Israeli economy.  No sovereign nation on earth would accept that its citizens be terrorized without attempting to stop the attacks.  The fact that Palestinians have far more casualties than Israel isn’t really relevant because Israel does not target civilians, and each and every civilian death is Hamas’ fault.

The low number of Israeli casualties is not due to lack of trying on Hamas’ part.  If Hamas rockets were not intercepted by the Iron Dome, the number of Israeli casualties would be far higher than Palestinian casualties.  Let’s look at it this way: if a Hamas rocket managed to reach a large building in Tel Aviv and killed thousands of Israeli civilians, would that mean that by virtue of proportionality Israel would now be justified in killing thousands of Palestinian civilians?  Of course not.

The war in Gaza is not a football game.  When Germany beat Brazil 7-1 at the 2014 FIFA World Cup, near the end of the game many German fans felt sorry for Brazil because they did not want to humiliate Brazilians.  In that case, speaking of proportionality made sense – there is no need for Germany to win by a huge margin in order to win the cup.  The war in Gaza, however, is not a game.  It is an attempt by Israel to stop terrorist attacks on its citizens.  If Israel stopped its operation without reaching its objective and simply because of the need to maintain some misplaced proportionality, would that be desirable?  Certainly it wouldn’t be desirable because Israelis would continue to be terrorized by Hamas rockets and sooner or later Israel would have to go after Hamas again anyway.

The one and only way to end repeated wars in Gaza is to stop Hamas and its allies from attacking Israel.  This can be done in two ways, either by Israel putting so much control over Gaza that terrorists can no longer re-arm, or it can be done by having the Palestinians choose a Gaza leadership that is willing to recognize that violence is not the answer.  The latter is of course the preferred outcome, but lacking that, no reasonable person can blame Israel for attempting to achieve the former, and each and every casualty along the way is Hamas’ doing.

Conflit arabe / Israël : la Palestine en Suspens

C’est à la mode de blâmer Israël pour le fait que l’état palestinien n’a pas encore été créé. Ces jours-ci, Israël est souvent critiqué à cause de ses colonies en Cisjordanie. Personnellement, je suis contre les colonies, non pas parce qu'ils sont illégales (les opinions sur ce point sont divisées), mais parce qu'ils affaiblissent les palestiniens modérés (quels qu'ils soient) et ils renforcent ceux qui jurent de ne jamais accepter aucune sorte de paix avec Israël.

La question que je voudrais explorer ici est de savoir si les arabes ont fait tout ce qu'ils pouvaient pour créer l'état palestinien qu'ils disent maintenant vouloir. Bien que beaucoup d’évènements aient eu lieu avant 1948, y compris les occasions manquées pour les arabes d’accepter la présence juive au Moyen-Orient, pour cette discussion, je vais commencer par le plan de partition des Nations Unies du 29 Novembre 1947.

Le plan de partition des Nations Unies alloua 43% de la Palestine mandataire (précédemment occupé par la Grande-Bretagne) pour un état arabe avec une population juive de seulement 1%, alors qu'il a alloua 56% de la Palestine mandataire à un état juif avec 45% de population arabe. Les dirigeants juifs acceptèrent le plan avec hésitation, mais les états arabes le rejetèrent. Si les arabes l’avaient accepté, l '«état juif» aurait été faible, et avec 45% d'arabes, il n’aurait été un état juif que de nom. Les arabes auraient créé une Palestine presque purement arabe dans les 43% qui leur était attribué.

En plus de refuser le plan de l’ONU, les arabes commencèrent une guerre contre l’état d'Israël dès qu'il était déclaré en mai 1948. La guerre causa plus de 12 000 morts, et elle se termina dix mois plus tard par un armistice. Pour l’armistice, Israel signa des accords séparés avec l’Égypte, la Jordanie, le Liban, et la Syrie, laissant à Israël 78% de la Palestine mandataire et moins d'arabes que dans le plan de partition de l'ONU étant donné qu’environ 750 000 arabes furent chassés ou quittèrent avec l'intention de retourner après une victoire arabe.

La guerre de 1948 constitua une perte énorme pour les arabes. Ils perdirent un plan de partition qui les favorisait, et ils perdirent la contiguïté territoriale. Cependant, ils contrôlaient toujours le reste de la Palestine mandataire, et ils auraient pu déclarer unilatéralement la création d'un état palestinien dans ces territoires, mais ils choisirent de poursuivre les hostilités avec Israël.

Le 30 mai 1967, la Jordanie signa un pacte de défense mutuelle avec l’Égypte. L’Égypte se mobilisa en masse à la frontière sud d’Israël. Le 5 Juin, en mesure préventive, Israël lança une attaque aérienne surprise contre l’Égypte dans une guerre qui allait durer six jours. À la fin de la guerre, Israël avait occupé la péninsule du Sinaï (Égypte), la bande de Gaza (Palestine mandataire), la Cisjordanie (Palestine mandataire), Jérusalem-Est (Palestine mandataire), les fermes de Chebaa (Liban / Syrie), et le plateau du Golan (Syrie). Le territoire occupé par Israël était maintenant plusieurs fois la dimension du territoire alloué à l '« état juif» dans le plan de partition de l'ONU.

Les arabes auraient pu alors négocier le retour de leurs territoires en échange pour une paix durable avec Israël, ce que cet état désirait plus que tout. Ils auraient pu alors créer l'état palestinien en Cisjordanie et à Gaza. Au lieu de cela, en Août 1967 les dirigeants arabes se réunirent pour discuter de leur position envers Israël, et ils décidèrent qu'il n'y aurait pas de paix avec Israël, pas de reconnaissance d'Israël, et pas de négociation avec Israël (connu comme les « trois nons »).

Les hostilités entre Israël et les pays arabes continuèrent. Le 6 Octobre 1973, durant de la fête de Yom Kippour, le jour le plus important du calendrier juif, la Syrie et l'Égypte organisèrent une attaque surprise contre Israël. L'armée israélienne n'était pas préparée et prit trois jours pour se mobiliser. Ce délai permit à d'autres pays arabes d’envoyer des soldats pour aider les Égyptiens et les Syriens. Israël réussit quand même à se défendre, et après le cessez le feu du 25 Octobre, Israël avait encore augmenté le territoire qu'elle occupait, quoique légèrement.

Plus tard dans les années 1970, l'Égypte décida de conclure un accord de paix avec Israël. Les états arabes auraient pu s’unir pour négocier la paix avec Israël, et ils auraient pu achever la création d'un état palestinien. Au lieu de cela, les états arabes isolèrent le président égyptien Anouar El Sadate pour le punir d’avoir voulu faire la paix avec Israël.

En 1994, la Jordanie décida de négocier son propre accord de paix avec Israël. Ici aussi, le Liban et la Syrie auraient pu joindre les négociations et obtenir un état palestinien, mais de nouveau ils choisirent de ne pas créer l'état palestinien.

Maintenant en Mars 2014, la Syrie et le Liban sont enfoncés dans des luttes internes, et les palestiniens divisés participent sans conviction aux négociations de paix avec Israël, mais dû au soutien de l'Iran pour Hamas et Hezbollah et au refus arabe de régler la question des réfugiés palestiniens, les pourparlers de paix vont probablement échouer ou aboutir à un nouvel accord intérimaire.

Dans leur relation avec Israël, les états arabes ont eu de nombreuses occasions de créer un état palestinien, mais leur incapacité totale à accepter un état juif au Moyen-Orient a fait que depuis 66 ans, ils ont préféré laisser les palestiniens apatrides et la Palestine en suspens. Aujourd'hui, plus que jamais, les pays arabes sont paralysés par les conflits internes, les guerres civiles, et les régimes tyranniques, et pourtant ils blâment leurs malheurs sur Israël et autres démocraties libérales.

Étant d'origine arabe, j'ai honte de ce que les arabes ont fait et continuent de faire, mais je veux aussi croire que les conflits arabes peuvent être résolus. Je crois que le problème principal des arabes est qu’ils n'ont pas de dirigeants compétents et honnêtes comme l’était l'ancien président égyptien Anouar El Sadat. Ils ont besoin de dirigeants qui croient en leur avenir en tant que nations fortes et capables d’être des partenaires égaux dans la paix et dans le commerce. Ils ont besoin de dirigeants modernes, intelligents, et instruits au lieu de faibles, de truands, et de démagogues, et la Palestine pourra enfin devenir une réalité.

Arab/Israel Conflict: Palestine Delayed

It has become fashionable to blame Israel for the failure to create a Palestinian state.  These days, Israel is often criticized and even vilified over its settlements in the West Bank.  Personally, I don’t support the settlements, not because they are illegal (there are conflicting views on this point), but because they weaken the Palestinian moderates (whoever they may be) and they strengthen the hand of those who vow to never accept any sort of peace with Israel.

The question that I would like to explore here is whether the Arabs have done everything that they could to create the Palestinian state that they now claim they want.  Although much has happened before 1948, including missed opportunities for Arabs for reconcile with the Jewish presence in the Middle East, for the purpose of this discussion, let’s start with the UN partition plan of November 29, 1947.

The UN partition plan allocated 43% of Mandatory Palestine (previously occupied by Britain) to an Arab State with only 1% Jewish population while it allocated 56% of Mandatory Palestine to a Jewish State with 45% Arab population.  The Jewish leaders reluctantly approved the plan, but the Arab states rejected it.  Had the Arabs accepted it, the “Jewish State” would have been small, and with 45% Arabs, it would have been a Jewish State only in name.  The Arabs could have created an almost purely Arab Palestine in the 43% allocated to them.

In addition to refusing the plan, the Arabs started a war against the state of Israel as soon as it was declared in May 1948.  The war resulted in over 12,000 casualties, and it ended 10 months later with an armistice.  The armistice as signed in separate agreements with Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria, left Israel with 78% of Mandatory Palestine and fewer Arabs than outlined in the UN partition plan since about 750,000 Arabs were either chased away or left with the intention of coming back after the war had ended.

The war of 1948 was a huge loss for the Arabs.  They lost the right to a UN partition plan that favoured them, and they lost territorial contiguity.  However, they still controlled the rest of Mandatory Palestine, and they could have unilaterally declared the creation of a Palestinian state in those territories.  Instead, they chose to continue hostilities with Israel.

On May 30, 1967, Jordan signed a mutual defense pact with Egypt. Egypt mobilized and massed on Israel's southern border. On June 5, in a preventative strike, Israel launched a surprise air-based attack on Egypt in a war that would last six days. By the end of the war, Israel had occupied the Sinai Peninsula (Egypt), Gaza (Mandatory Palestine), the West Bank (Mandatory Palestine), East Jerusalem (Mandatory Palestine), Shebaa farms (Lebanon/Syria), and the Golan Heights (Syria).  The land occupied by Israel was now several folds larger than the land allocated to the “Jewish State” in the UN partition plan.

At that point, Arabs could have negotiated back their land in exchange for giving Israel what it desired, which was peace with its neighbours.  They could then create the Palestinian state in the West bank and Gaza.  Instead, in August 1967, Arab leaders met to discuss the Arab position toward Israel, and they decided that there would be no recognition, no peace, and no negotiations with Israel (also known as "the three NOs").

The hostilities between Israel and Arab states continued.  On October 6, 1973, during Yom Kippur, the most important day of the Jewish calendar, Syria and Egypt staged a surprise attack on Israel. The Israeli military was unprepared and took about three days to mobilize. This gave time to other Arab states to send troops to help the Egyptians and Syrians. Israel managed to fight back, and after the ceasefire on October 25, Israel had increased even further the land that it occupied, even if only slightly.

Later in the 1970s, Egypt decided to reach a peace agreement with Israel.  At that point, Arab states could have united in negotiating peace with Israel, and they could have secured the creation of a Palestinian state.  Instead, Arabs states vilified Egyptian President Anwar El Sadat for his initiative.

In 1994, Jordan decided to negotiate its own peace agreement with Israel.  Again, Lebanon and Syria could have joined in the negotiations and secured a Palestinian state, but again they chose to stay out and leave the future of the Palestinian state unresolved.

Now in March 2014, Syria and Lebanon are mired in infighting, and the divided Palestinians are going through the motions of yet one more round of peace negotiations with Israel, but Iran’s support for Hamas and Hezbollah, and Syria’s and Lebanon’s refusal to settle the issue of Palestinian refugees all mean that the peace talks are likely to fail or end in another inconclusive interim agreement.

In their relationship with Israel, Arab states have had many opportunities to create a Palestinian state, but their complete inability to accept a Jewish state in the Middle East has meant that for 66 years, they have preferred to leave the Palestinians stateless and Palestine unresolved.  Today, more than ever, Arab states are stalled in internal conflicts, civil wars, and state tyrannies, and yet they blame their woes on Israel and other liberal democracies.

As someone of Arab origin, I am ashamed of what Arabs have done and continue to do, but I also want to believe that the Arab conflicts can be resolved.  I believe that what Arabs lack most is competent and honest leadership like the one provided by former Egyptian President Anwar El Sadat.  They need leaders who believe in their futures as strong nations able to be equal partners in peace and in trade.  They need modern, smart, and educated leaders instead of weaklings, thugs, and demagogues, and then Palestine might finally become a reality.

Fred Maroun

March 2014